Neither boom nor bust: how Houston's housing market differs from nation's by Amber C. McCullagh & Robert W. Gilmer
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Neither Boom nor Bust: How Houston’s 
Housing Market Differs from Nation’s
Houston did not 
share in the rapid 
price appreciation 
seen by some large 
metros in the early 
2000s or the sharp 
downturn. But the 
tightening of credit 
standards since August 
has affected Houston 
disproportionately. 
T he ongoing housing 
downturn has served as a signifi-
cant headwind for the U.S. econ-
omy, subtracting nearly a per-
centage point from the country’s 
gross domestic product growth 
in each of the past six quarters. 
However, this downturn has not 
been uniform across the country. 
Houston is an example of a met-
ropolitan area that was seem-
ingly immune to the trend until 
its housing market began slow-
ing significantly in mid-2007. 
Houston did not share in 
the rapid price appreciation 
seen by some large metros in 
the early 2000s or the sharp 
downturn of late 2006 and 
early 2007. But the tightening 
of credit standards since August 
has affected Houston dispropor-
tionately. Mortgage and housing 
markets have seen wide varia-
tions in performance as a result 
of the downturn, and this is 
Houston’s story in the context 
of the national housing market 
turmoil. 
U.S. Housing Rise and Fall 
Fundamentally, employ-
ment and population growth 
are primary drivers of long-term 
housing market demand. As the 
U.S. economy emerged from a 
relatively short and shallow 2001 
recession, improving job growth 
boosted housing demand and, 
ultimately, home prices. 
In this period, though, an 
additional boost came from low 
mortgage interest rates. After 
peaking at 8.52 percent in May 
2000, the average interest rate 
for a fixed 30-year mortgage fell 
to 5.45 percent in March 2004, 
a 25-year low.1 It remained less 
than 6.5 percent through first 
quarter 2006, opening the door 
to many potential homeown-
ers. Augmenting this increase 
in demand, financial institutions 
developed new mortgage prod-
ucts that further broadened the 
number of potential buyers. 
We observe this higher 
demand in an accelerating rate 
of new-home construction and 
in price appreciation for existing 
homes (Figure 1). 2
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Phase I: Demand and Price 
Increases 
In the first phase of the U.S. 
housing market boom and bust, 
many large cities (primarily on 
the East and West coasts) saw 
a prolonged run-up in prices. 
Demand for housing, driven by 
low interest rates and a grow-
ing economy, combined with 
supply restrictions—such as 
zoning laws, high permitting 
costs and “not in my backyard” 
regulations—to contribute to 
rapid price appreciation. Figure 
2 shows how low levels of con-
struction in the face of strong 
demand contributed to signifi-
cant price appreciation in most 
of the 12 largest U.S. 
metros.2 These price 
increases then fed 
off themselves. Ris-
ing prices—whether 
for gold, corn or 
houses—often foster 







cannot last forever 
since higher prices 
inevitably reduce 
the pool of potential 
buyers. This result is 
illustrated in Table 1, 
showing the percent-
age of houses in these 
12 metros that are 
affordable, based on 
prevailing interest 
rates for conventional 
30-year mortgages, 
for a family earning 
the area’s median 
income. In 2001, 
at least a third of 
houses were afford-
able for a median-
income family in 
all but one of these 
areas, but affordabil-
ity has declined rap-
idly in the six years 
since. In Atlanta, 
Dallas and Houston, affordabil-
ity has fallen but remains at sus-
tainable levels. 
As shown in Figure 2, 
these markets have weathered 
increased demand largely with 
new construction rather than 
price appreciation because 
of the ease of building new 
homes.3 While some are dismis-
sive of this developer-friendly 
attitude that allows such rapid 
construction, the approach 
clearly carries significant ben-
efits for the homebuyer, both in 
selection and in price. We will 
return to this subject at length in 
a subsequent section. 
Phase II: Tightened Credit Standards 
Price appreciation is now 
turning to price decline in 
many cities that saw the most 
rapid increases. And for many 
homeowners who counted on 
price appreciation rather than a 
down payment to build equity 
in their homes or who are now 
stretching to afford their homes 
as mortgage rates adjust, these 
price declines have contributed 
to the second phase of the 
downturn: mortgage defaults 
and tightened credit. 
In August 2007, when mort-
gage-related financial instru-
ments began to see substantial 
losses, banks engaged in a 
flight to quality, lending only to 
the least risky customers. As a 
result, subprime, Alt-A, low doc-
umentation and other uncon-
ventional loans fell out of favor. 
Sales of new and existing homes 
in high-priced markets already 
were stressed by the lack of 
affordability and the collapse of 
speculative buying; now they 
are being hurt by the limited 
use of new mortgage products. 
Originally, subprime lend-
ing was intended to fit a nar-
row niche of primarily young or 
minority homebuyers, allowing 
them to qualify for mortgages 
Figure 1 
U.S. Construction, Price Appreciation Rise Above Trend 
Before Falling 























Fitted trend Fitted trend 
’08 
*Seasonally adjusted annual rate. 
SOURCES: Census Bureau; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. 
Figure 2 
Single-Family Permits, Price Appreciation in 12 Largest Metros 
Price appreciation (percent) 












Washington  New York 





Permits (percent of population) 
NOTES: Figures annualized. Permit data are for November 1997–November 2007. 
Price appreciation data are for third quarter 1997–third quarter 2007. 
SOURCES: Census Bureau; Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight; 
authors’ calculations. 
Table 1 
Housing Opportunity Index 
(Percent of homes affordable based on area’s 
median household income) 
Q3 ’01  Q3 ’07 
Atlanta  71.2  63.7 
Boston  41.8  26.6 
Chicago  56.1  40.3 
Dallas  67.0  53.7 
Detroit  65.1  83.9 
Houston  64.4  47.4 
Los Angeles  35.6  3.7 
Miami  55.1  10.6 
New York City  54.8  7.1 
Philadelphia  60.6  38.5 
San Francisco  7.8  7.0 
Washington, D.C.  75.4  35.0 
NOTE: Because the HOI was computed using the 2000 census 
before 2005 and the 2005 American Community Survey 
from 2005 onward, the data from these two periods 
are not strictly comparable. But they suffice for our 
purpose of comparing very broad trends. 
SOURCE: National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo 
Housing Opportunity Index. 2
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sooner than otherwise possible. 
In recent years, however, lenders 
misused these mortgages in a 
significant departure from nor-
mal lending standards. Indeed, 
along with job growth and low 
interest rates, the subprime mar-
ket became an important factor 
in driving demand for home-
ownership. 
Just how widespread these 
subprime and other noncon-
forming lending practices 
became is indicated in Table 2, 
which shows the percentage of 
2006 mortgage originations that 
were “high cost,” or at least 3 
percentage points higher than 
prevailing rates or Treasury 
securities of equivalent duration. 
By 2006, most of the largest U.S. 
cities depended on these high-
cost mortgages for a significant 
portion of home sales, ranging 
from 18 to 45 percent in the 12 
largest metros. 
The first phase of the cur-
rent housing crisis was the 
bursting of the price bubble in 
a few large U.S. metros. But the 
second phase—the August 2007 
withdrawal of the subprime 
stimulus—affected a much 
wider range of cities, including 
high-construction markets like 
Houston. 
The Houston Example 
Phase I: Construction, Not Price 
Increases 
Houston saw tremendous 
job and population growth 
over the last decade, ranking 
it high among the 12 largest 
U.S. metropolitan areas in both 
metrics (Table 3). Projections 
from the Texas Office of the 
State Demographer indicate that 
this population expansion will 
continue, with Harris County 
predicted to grow an annualized 
1.5 percent over the next five 
years.4 
Given that Houstonians had 
access to the same new types 
of mortgages as the rest of the 
country and that Houston has 
had greater population growth 
than other large metros, we 
might expect price appreciation 
to be stronger in Houston than 
elsewhere. However, the oppo-
site has been true. 
Houston’s large supply of 
land means that demand growth 
primarily results in more con-
struction, not higher prices. 
Construction levels are limited 
by the availability of two kinds 
of developable land: the previ-
ously undeveloped, generally 
found on a metro’s outskirts, 
and the redeveloping, usually in 
a city’s interior. In both cases, 
Houston’s policies are relatively 
permissive, making the metro 
friendly toward development. 
The most fundamental dif-
Table 2 
Percentage of 2006 Mortgage Originations 
That Were High-Cost 
Atlanta  24.4 
Boston  17.7 
Chicago  27.2 
Dallas  29.4 
Detroit  37.2 
Houston  33.9 
Los Angeles  32.3 
Miami  45.1 
New York City  22.4 
Philadelphia  18.4 
San Francisco  22.4 
Washington, D.C.  22.7 
SOURCES: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data from 
ffiec.com; authors’ calculations. 
Table 3 
Annualized Growth Rates, Percent 
Population  Jobs 
Atlanta  3.19  1.82 
Boston*  .39  .31 
Chicago  .78  .31 
Dallas  2.59  1.69 
Detroit  .07  –.83 
Houston  2.52  1.86 
Los Angeles  .93  .92 
Miami  1.60  1.85 
New York City  .60  .78 
Philadelphia  .41  .74 
San Francisco  .53  .40 
Washington, D.C.  1.66  2.32 
*Boston metropolitan statistical area data exclude New 
Hampshire. 
NOTE: Population data are for 1997–2006. Jobs data are 
for December 1997–December 2007. 
SOURCES: Census Bureau; Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
authors’ calculations. 
ference between Houston and 
other cities lies in how they 
provide (or in Houston’s case, 
do not provide) water, sewer 
and drainage to developments 
on the urban fringe. In Houston, 
developers can create a munici-
pal utility district, or MUD, to 
provide these services on their 
properties and can finance these 
with tax-free bonds. Houston 
requires developers to build 
MUDs in such a way that they 
eventually could be connected 
to the city’s corresponding infra-
structure, but they begin as self-
sufficient enterprises. 
In other cities, develop-
ments must be connected to 
the city’s water and sewer 
lines, confining new projects to 
nearby or adjacent land since 
the cost of building lengthy 
lines is prohibitive. In metro 
Houston, by contrast, virtually 
any large parcel of land can 
become a new suburb, espe-
cially given the metro’s expan-
sive highway system. Experience 
bears out this conceptual frame-
work, with significant Houston 
suburbs like Katy and Spring 
developing and prospering 
before many closer-in areas. 
But Houston does not just 
have a larger supply of available 
land on its outskirts. Unlike all 
other large U.S. cities, Houston 
lacks zoning laws restricting 
industrial, commercial and resi-
dential construction to specific 
neighborhoods. Many inner-city 
Houston neighborhoods protect 
property values through deed 
restrictions diligently enforced 
by private neighborhood asso-
ciations, and the large, planned 
suburban communities oper-
ate similarly.5 But much of the 
land in metro Houston is not 
assigned a specific use. 
So much land is avail-
able in Houston that the cost 
of each incremental unit rises 
slowly and keeps the average 
cost below that of more restric-
tive metros. Even in the face of 2
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significant population growth, 
this large supply keeps land 
prices in Houston stable, which 
over time contributes to lower 
home prices. (See box titled 
“Land Supply, Construction 
and Home Prices” for a simple 
illustration of the relevant sup-
ply–demand framework.) 
Indeed, Houston and other 
metros such as Dallas and 
Atlanta that have relatively more 
permissive development policies 
have lower housing prices than 
more restrictive places do. 
At $155,800, Houston’s 
median house price is the third 
lowest among the 12 largest 
U.S. metropolitan areas and is 
less than half the average for 
these cities (Table 4). Houston’s 
median price is lower than even 
the national average, which 
includes inexpensive rural areas. 
By comparison, the median 
house price in metropolitan San 
Francisco, where zoning laws 
and building codes are very 
strict, is $825,400. 
This result—more zoning 
bringing higher prices—is a 
robust one. Economists Edward 
Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko 
find that house prices across the 
country are positively related 
to the degree of zoning and 
regulation.6 Even in Houston, 
there is evidence that houses in 
deed-restricted neighborhoods 
or in zoned cities within the 
metro area are more expensive 
than comparable ones outside 
these areas.7 But with plenty of 
unzoned neighborhoods remain-
ing, Houston house prices, on 
the whole, are restrained near 
construction costs.8 
In summary, Houston’s 
low-and-slow home prices have 
made real estate a relatively 
accessible and safe investment 
for the area’s residents even 
as other cities’ markets have 
become expensive and volatile. 
The early phases of the current 
housing downturn—the boom 
and bust in prices—were barely 
felt in Houston.9 
Phase II: The Subprime Problem 
Rather, Houston began to 
feel the housing pinch in the 
second phase of the downturn: 
diminished credit availability 
and the sudden narrowing of 
the market due to the loss of 
high-cost mortgages. 
The withdrawal of subprime 
lending likely will deepen the 
decline of markets like Washing-
ton, D.C., Boston and Los Ange-
les, which already are in a tail-
spin from falling home prices. In 
high-construction markets like 
Houston, Dallas and Atlanta, the 
reduced pool of potential home-
buyers since August 2007 marks 




conditions and the 
local housing mar-
ket is evident in 
Houston’s existing-
home sales, which 
declined substan-
tially in September 
(Figure 3), imme-




the fall, with exist-
ing-home sales 
Figure 3 
Houston Existing-Home Sales 























SOURCES: Houston Association of Realtors; authors’ calculations. 
Table 4 
Median House Prices 
(Third quarter 2007) 
Atlanta  $175,300 
Boston*  $414,700 
Chicago  $286,400 
Dallas  $146,800 
Detroit  $142,900 
Houston  $155,800 
Los Angeles  $588,400 
Miami  $346,800 
New York City  $476,100 
Philadelphia  $243,000 
San Francisco  $825,400 
Washington, D.C.  $438,000 
Average of 12 largest metros  $353,300 
National median  $220,800 
*Boston data exclude New Hampshire. 
SOURCE: National Association of Realtors. 
down 23.5 percent year-over-
year in December. Further, the 
decline began at the low end 
of the market, exactly where 
local consumers had relied most 
heavily on subprime and Alt-A 
loans.10 Luckily for Houston, the 
nationwide price correction that 
began earlier this year caused 
many national homebuilders 
to abandon projects across the 
country, including in Hous-
ton, where the market was still 
strong. The result is that inven-
tories are likely lower than they 
would have been if not for this 
exogenous effect. 
As the housing downturn 
unfolds, Houston is in a rela-
tively strong position. The metro 
will not escape without signifi-
cant correction, but forces are at 
work to limit the damage. 
In 2006, Houston relied 
more heavily on high-cost lend-
ing than many other large metro 
areas did. The resulting correc-
tion, however, takes place in 
the context of prices that are 
squarely in line with local con-
struction costs and without the 
painful supply-induced down-
turn under way in many other 
markets. 
Perhaps the most power-
ful force working in Houston’s 
favor is that the metro remains 
a strong beneficiary of the cur-
rent global commodity boom. 
As the seat of the U.S. energy      
         
         
       
           
     
     
       
       
         
         
       
     
   
     
   
     
       
       
           
     
             
   
 
           
       
       
           
           
     
         
     
         
         
         
       
       
       
           
       
         
 
           
         
         
             
       
 
             
         
         
       
     
         
       
       
 
           
       
       
     
     
         
       
           
         
         
         
           
         
         
         
           
             
         
       
     
         
         
         
         
     
                
         
       
         
         
         
 
           
       
           
         
       
                                 
                                   
                             
                         
                                       
                                   
                                   
     
                                     
                           
                         
                                 
                             
                               
 
                                   
                       
                             
 
   
   
industry, Houston is generat-
ing large numbers of jobs,11 
and the outlook for job growth 
remains good. There are down-
side risks to oil and other com-
modity prices, particularly as 
the U.S. economy decelerates 
and perhaps slows other econo-
mies along with it. However, 
Houston’s surest route to a short 
and mild correction in the local 
housing market is through con-
tinued strong population, job 
and income growth. 
— Amber C. McCullagh 
Robert W. Gilmer 
McCullagh is an economic 
research assistant at the Houston 
Branch of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas. Gilmer is a vice 
president at the Bank. 
Notes 
1  According to Freddie Mac. Data can be 
found at www.freddiemac.com/pmms/ 
pmms30.htm. 
2  Some data are reported by metro-
politan statistical area (MSA) and 
others by metropolitan division, into 
which some large MSAs are divided. 
In cases where MSA data are not 
available, metropolitan division data 
are aggregated or combined into a 
weighted average by population. 
3  Along with Atlanta, Dallas and 
Houston, Detroit is also an affordable 
housing market. In Detroit, however, 
this affordability results from overall 
economic malaise over the last 
five years, making it fundamentally 
different from the other three areas, 
where housing markets have remained 
affordable in the face of rapid 
economic growth. 
4  This compares with 0.8 percent for 
Texas, which is expected to outpace 
national growth during this period. 
Data are available on the Office of the 
State Demographer’s website at http:// 
txsdc.utsa.edu/tpepp/2006projections. 
5  The absence of zoning does not imply 
that developers have free rein. The 
city has extensive building codes, 
setback, parking, landscape and other 
development restrictions. The primary 
conflict that has arisen without zoning 
has been confrontations between high-
rise development and affluent inner-
city neighborhoods. 
6  “The Impact of Zoning on Housing 
Affordability,” by Edward Glaeser and 
Joseph Gyourko, Harvard Institute of 
Economic Research Discussion Paper 
no. 1948, March 2002. 
7  “The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions 
on Market Values of Single-Family 
Homes in Houston,” by Janet Speyrer, 
Journal of Finance and Economics, 
June 1989, pp. 117–30. While this 
study is not recent, the fundamentals 
of the Houston real estate market have 
not changed since its publication, and 
a crude examination of current real 
estate prices bears out its findings. 
8  See Glaeser and Gyourko (note 6). 
9  Any spillover to Houston in the early 
phases of the housing downturn was 
minor and confined to new-home 
construction, where homebuilders’ 
issues elsewhere led them to abandon 
projects in Houston, and perhaps also 
to a slowing in relocations resulting 
from potential migrants’ inability to sell 
homes in weaker markets. 
10  This is in contrast to other markets, 
where subprime loans were used to 
stretch incomes to finance move-up 
purchases of homes at middle and 
higher price levels, or for speculative 
purchases to take advantage of rapid 
price appreciation. 
11  According to the Dallas Fed’s re-
benchmarked data, Houston has seen 
job gains of 322,000 over the last 
four years, a 14.2 percent increase 
(equivalent to an annualized 3.4 
percent). 
Land Supply, Construction and Home Prices 
The use of municipal utility districts and a lack of zoning in Houston foster a highly elastic supply 
of land. This is depicted in Figure A, which shows how a strong shift in demand for homes, perhaps 
through population growth or lower interest rates (Phase I), brings a different response in cities that 
have an elastic (including Houston) versus inelastic (San Francisco, among others) land supply. The 
left chart shows that with an elastic supply of land, the shift of the demand curve from D to D′ results 
in greater delivery of homes to the market and a small price increase. In the right chart, depicting cities 
with a more inelastic supply, we see the shift in the demand curve results in much larger price increases 
and fewer homes constructed. 
Phase II of the correction (Figure B) has meant a shift in demand from D′ to D″, and this down-
turn can be attributed specifically to tightened credit in the high-cost mortgage market, bringing fewer 
potential homebuyers. Because of Houston’s heavy use of these mortgages compared with other cities, 
the metro has been affected more than cities with a lower concentration of high-cost loans. As with the 
initial demand shift, the correction will fall heavily on homebuilding rather than home prices in Houston, 
while it will mean price drops more than a homebuilding downturn in cities with more restrictive land 
use policies. 
In Houston, the process of shifting the demand curve from D″ back to D′ will have to be done 
the old-fashioned way—through population and employment growth. A continuation of the rapid job 
growth Houston has seen since 2004 would keep the building downturn shallow and shorten the period 
of malaise. 
Figure A 
Phase I: Population Growth and Lower Mortgage Rates 















Phase II: Tightened Credit to Subprime Borrowers 














NOTE: S = Supply, D = Demand. 
SOURCE: Authors’ construction.  
     
         
         
       
       
         
       
       
           
       
     
       
         
       
     
       
     
     
       
         
       
     
   
     
       
     
       
     
 
         
       
         
     
       
       
       
           
     
         
       
           
       
         
       
   
       
       
     
       
     
       
     
       
       
         
     
     
     
       
       
         
   
       
         
       
       
       
       
           
     
         
     
     
     
         
       
       
         
     
       
     
     
     
       
       
     
     
       
   
         
   
   
     
       
       
       
     
     
     
       
   
         
         
     
       
     
     
 
   
       
         
         
         
       
           
           
         
       
       
         
     
     
       
       
       
     
       
     







T he Houston economy is 
probably on track to have added 
100,000 new jobs in 2007, once 
all the revisions are complete. 
The local economy continues to 
click along, with the one notable 
exception of housing. Oil prices 
above $90 per barrel continue 
to work their magic for the city, 
despite slower growth at the 
national level. Looking ahead, 
however, if the slowdown were 
to become more serious for the 
world’s largest economy, it could 
spell adverse consequences for 
both oil markets and Houston. 
Retail Sales and Autos 
Local retail sales during 
the holidays were disappoint-
ing for many stores. Clothing 
was a major problem, as warm 
weather kept the stores over-
stocked through the Thanks-
giving weekend. Discounting 
began even before holiday 
shopping got serious and then 
seemed to snowball. Depart-
ment and furniture stores were 
off significantly, discount stores 
about flat. 
Local car and truck sales, in 
contrast, finished the year strong 
and were up 2.6 percent for 
2007 as a whole. 
Real Estate 
Sales continue to decline for 
both new and existing homes. 
New-home sales are likely to 
finish the year down by 20 per-
cent or more. Existing-home 
sales were down only 4 percent 
through November, with most of 
the decline at the lower end of 
the market. The correction pro-
cess is falling primarily on sales 
rather than home prices, which 
have remained steady. 
Strong job growth is keep-
ing other real estate markets 
healthy. Apartments are leasing 
rapidly, but thousands of units 
under construction keep both 
rents and occupancy from sig-
nificant gains. Retail continues 
strong throughout the city. The 
office market remains the star, 
however, with a good year for 
occupancy and rent assured 
in 2008, barring unforeseen 
and serious economic prob-
lems. Energy continues to drive 
demand for office space, and 
construction is a couple of years 
behind the curve. 
Energy Prices and Reining 
Crude oil prices pushed to 
near $100 per barrel in early 
January, driven by OPEC’s deci-
sion to maintain current produc-
tion; by geopolitical issues in 
Iran, Nigeria and Pakistan; and 
by a sharp decline in U.S. inven-
tories. Gasoline prices followed 
crude prices up, and heating oil 
rose with additional momentum 
coming from sparse inventories. 
Refinery utilization held at 
about 90 percent, typical for this 
time of year. Refiner margins 
were dampened by the rising 
price of crude inputs and by 
highway diesel and gasoline 
prices that lagged well behind 
crude. 
Natural gas prices were 
under downward pressure from 
moderate winter weather and 
inventories that are about 10 
percent above normal for mid-
winter. They were supported, 
however, by sharply rising 
oil prices. Natural gas prices 
remained range-bound between 
$7 and $8 per thousand cubic 
feet. 
Petrochemicals 
Petrochemical demand has 
eased significantly. Domestic 
demand continued to weaken 
in response to poor housing 
and auto activity, and export 
demand eased for most prod-
ucts. Caustic soda exports 
remained strong and ethylene 
and polyethylene revived some 
at year-end, but propylene and 
polypropylene were largely 
priced out of the export mar-
ket. Following a string of price 
increases for plastics throughout 
2007, price pressures on polyvi-
nyl chloride, polyethylene and 
polypropylene seemed to ease 
at year-end. 
Oil Services and Machinery 
Domestic drilling held 
steady near 1,800 working rigs, 
but the Texas rig count jumped 
sharply, once again led by work 
in the Barnett shale near Fort 
Worth. Expectations are for drill-
ing to decline in Canada in 2008 
and remain steady or pick up in 
the U.S. and for lucrative inter-
national work to continue to 
grow. Pricing is mixed depend-
ing on the line of business, 
on domestic weakness versus 
international strength and on 
declines in some durable goods 
versus better pricing for nondu-
rable products consumed in the 
drilling process. Overall, price 
pressures in oil services have 
eased significantly since last 
spring. 